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RITES, RIGHTS, AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS:
WHY AND HOW SHOULD THE LAW
SUPPORT MARRIAGE?
MAGGIE GALLAGHER*
Marriage is the subject of considerable political controversy
and debate: from "covenant marriage" and other divorce law
reforms, to President Bush's efforts to add "marriage promotion"
to the welfare reform law, to efforts to promote (or stop) same-
sex marriage, and to the American Law Institute's proposed new
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution.1
Before we can evaluate specific legal proposals, however, we
need a theory of the relationship between marriage and the law.
We are living off inherited intellectual capital, ideas about the
relationship between marriage and the state worked out during
the Protestant Reformation.2 In a modern multi-religious society
should the law help sustain marriage at all? And if so, why, and
how? What is the public purpose of marriage? Why do we have
laws about it? What is the state's interest in this intimate act?
I. WHAT IS MARRIAGE? EVOLVING JUDICIAL VIEWS
Courts in the United States have long recognized that there
is a vital state interest in the institution of marriage. In recent
years, however, they have been less confident and less articulate
about what this vital state interest actually is. A century ago, the
Supreme Court recognized in Maynard v. Hill' that marriage "is
the foundation of the family and of society, without which there
would be neither civilization nor progress."4 As late as 1942, in
* Maggie Gallagher is President of the Institute for Marriage and Public
Policy (imapp.org) in Washington D.C. and co-author of The Case for Mariage:
Why Married People Are Happier, Healthier and Better-Off Financially.
1. See generally PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2002).
2. John Witte,Jr., The Goods and Goals of Marriage, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
1019, 1045-59 (2001); see also Don Browning, What is Marriage?: An Exploration,
in THE BOOK OF MARRIAGE: THE WISEST ANSWERS TO THE TOUGHEST QUESTIONS
1 (Dana Mack & David Blankenhorn eds., 2001);JOHN WITTE,JR., FROM SACRA-
MENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, RELIGION AND LAw IN THE WESTERN TRADITION
(1997).
3. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
4. Id. at 211.
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Skinner v. Oklahoma,' the Supreme Court recognized that mar-
riage "and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the race."6
But the relationship between marriage and progress (much
less civilization or survival), once crystal clear to courts and other
educated Americans, is no longer self-evident. More contempo-
rary court rhetoric sounds increasingly platitudinous notes. For
example, a 2002 Wisconsin appellate court described marriage as
"the foundation of family and of society" which is "basic to moral-
ity and civilization, and of vital interest to society and the state."7
A 2002 California appellate court similarly, if vaguely, agreed that
the state has a "vital interest" in marriage.8
Contemporary courts are rather more eloquent about the
individual interest in marriage, which is increasingly described
almost wholly in emotional, psychological, and/or symbolic
terms. In Griswold v. Connecticut,' the Supreme Court described
marriage as "intimate to the degree of being sacred"' ° (without,
however, concluding that legal marriage constituted an establish-
ment of religion). In Loving v. Virginia,1 the Supreme Court
waxed eloquent about marriage as a personal right "essential to
the orderly pursuit of happiness."12 By the eighties, the Court
had, at least rhetorically, transformed marriage from an indis-
pensable social institution to a useful tool in pursuit of individual
happiness. The family as a whole was increasingly described as
serving primarily individual interior, symbolic, and emotional
functions, and the state's interest was becoming correspondingly
to promote individual liberty to define the mystery of existence
for oneself in the realm of family law. "[I] ndividuals draw much
of their emotional enrichment from close ties with others;"
family helps protect "the ability . . . to define one's identity,"
which is "central to any concept of liberty.""
Once marriage is seen as primarily as a form of individual
self-expression, the Supreme Court and other legal elites have
5. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
6. Id. at 541.
7. Xiong ex rel. Edmonson v. Xiong, 648 N.W.2d 900, 906 (Wis. Ct. App.
2002) (citing Wis. STAT. § 765.01(2) (2003)).
8. Estate of DePasse, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 143, 148 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
9. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
10. Id. at 486.
11. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
12. Id. at 12.
13. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619 (1984).
14. Id. Thanks to Mark Strasser for highlighting this series of court deci-
sions in Mark Strasser, Harvesting the Fruits of Gardiner: On Marriage, Public Policy
and Fundamental Interests, 71 GEO. WASH. L. R~v. 179, 211-15 (2003).
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not unnaturally increasingly emphasized marriage as an individ-
ual right. The role of the state in marriage is increasingly
described as (a) conferring a title with certain symbolic value
and/or (b) creating a vehicle for conveying a defined set of legal
incidents. Marriage in this view consists of an individual right to
access certain material legal benefits. So at the state level, the
highest court of the State of Vermont ruled that the preamble to
the Vermont Constitution, guaranteeing that government should
be for the "common benefit" of all citizens, requires the legisla-
ture to either give access to marriage to same-sex couples or to
create an alternative institution with the same legal "benefits."
To prefer one form of union to another was to deny an individ-
ual the equal protection of the laws. As the Vermont court put it:
The legal benefits and protections flowing from a marriage
license are of such significance that any statutory exclusion
must necessarily be grounded on public concerns of suffi-
cient weight, cogency, and authority that the justice of the
deprivation cannot seriously be questioned. Considered in
light of the extreme logical disjunction between the classi-
fication and the stated purposes of the law-protecting
children and "furthering the link between procreation and
child rearing"-the exclusion falls substantially short of
this standard. 5
This partial and incomplete transformation of marriage into
an individual legal right is a relatively late development in the
law.16 Glancingly, in Loving v. Virginia, the Supreme Court con-
15. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 884 (Vt. 1999).
16. Many state courts continue to recognize the traditional role of mar-
riage in the creation of the next generation as primary. For example, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court blended the expressive and emotional value of marriage
to the individual with its social function in Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122
(Cal. 1976) ("[T]he structure of society itself largely depends upon the institu-
tion of marriage.... The joining of the man and woman in marriage is at once
the most socially productive and individually fulfilling relationship that one can
enjoy in the course of a lifetime."); see also Goodridge v. Department of Pub.
Health, No. 20011647A, 2002 WL 1299135, at *13 (Mass. Super. Ct. May 7,
2002) (finding that "because same-sex couples are unable to procreate on their
own and therefore must rely on inherently more cumbersome means of having
children, it is also rational to assume that same-sex couples are less likely to
have children or, at least, to have as many children as opposite-sex couples");
Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186 (Minn. 1971) ("The institution of mar-
riage as a union of man and woman, uniquely involving the procreation and
rearing of children within a family, is as old as the book of Genesis."); accord
Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 337 (D.C. 1995) (finding that the
statute's "central purpose ... provides the kind of rational basis ... permitting
limitation of marriage to heterosexual couples") (Ferren,J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (C.D. Cal.
2004]
228 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 18
sidered whether anti-miscegenation laws infringed on what it
called the "vital personal right to marry." 7 More fully, in Zablocki
v. Redhail"8 (where the Court struck down a Wisconsin law
preventing a parent in default of child support obligations from
marrying again), the Supreme Court ruled that individuals hav-
ing a new privacy right to procreate or not at will (embodied in
Eisenstadt v. Baird19 and Roe v. Wade2") must also have a personal
and private right to marry multiple times, regardless of whether
he or she lives up to the obligations of any previous marriage.
This idea of marriage as an individual right reached full culmina-
tion in Turner v. Safiey,21 in which the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional a Missouri statute which prohibited prisoners
from marrying. The fact that prisoners might not consummate a
marriage (and could not support any children financially or
emotionally) was held by the Supreme Court to be irrelevant, sig-
naling once again the newjudicial view of marriage as in essence
a form of individual expressive conduct: "Many important attrib-
utes of marriage remain, however, after taking into account the
limitations imposed by prison life. First, inmate marriages, like
others, are expressions of emotional support and public
commitment." 2
While many state courts continue to articulate an older
understanding of the reasons for state involvement in mar-
riage,23 the concept that the law's role in relation to marriage is
essentially to create an individual right to (a) express certain
emotions or values and (b) acquire certain legal benefits, now
permeates family law scholarship. Among family law scholars,
this view of marriage as primarily an emotional good created by
the private couple leads to calls (and in countries outside the
United States to judicial rulings and legislation) to abolish any
distinction between cohabitation and marriage, between what
1980), affd 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982) (observing that a "state has a compel-
ling interest in encouraging and fostering procreation of the race").
17. 388 U.S. at 1, 12 (1967) (emphasis added).
18. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-87 (1978).
19. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
20. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
21. 482 U.S. 78 (1986).
22. Id. at 95, cited in Lawrence Drew Borten, Sex, Procreation, and the State
Interest in Marriage, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1089, 1121-22 (2002).
23. See, e.g., Standhardt v. Superior Court ex rel. County of Maricopa, 77
P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003); Order on Motion to Dismiss, Morrison v. Sadler,
No. 49D13-0211-PL-001946 (Marion Super. Ct. May 7, 2003), available at http://
www.marriagewatch.org/cases/in/morrison/trial/order.pdf (last visited Oct.
31, 2003) (on file with the Notre DameJournal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy);
see also supra note 16.
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some call formal and informal unions. In the summer of 2000,
writing in Family Law Quarterly, distinguished family law scholar
Harry D. Krause put it this way:
[A]n irrational, sentimental cocoon... has clouded logical
discussion and intelligent debate.
• . . Today's sexual and associational lifestyles differ so
much that the state should not continue to deal with them
as though they were one: the old role-divided, procreative
marriage of history. That marriage may not yet be history,
but it should be seen for what is has become: one lifestyle
choice among many.
A pragmatic, rational approach would ask what social
functions of a particular association justify extending what
social benefits and privileges. Marriage, qua marriage,
would not be the one event that brings into play a whole
panoply of legal consequences. Instead, legal benefits and
obligations would be tailored according to the realities-
speak social value-of the parties' relationship. 24
Speaking about tax laws that treat married and cohabiting
couples differently, he concludes: "The rational answer seems
clear: Married and unmarried couples who are in the same fac-
tual positions should be treated alike. 25
II. MARRIAGE AS A RITE, CONVEYING RIGHTS: THE CASE OF ALI
The American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution builds upon this new view of marriage as primarily
symbolic expressive conduct (marriage as "a rite") that creates
certain legal "benefits" (marriage as a "right") .26 It is worth look-
ing at in some detail, because of ALI's character as a mainstream
legal body, and because the Principles of the Law of Family Dissolu-
tion represent the culmination of ten years of work by eminent
family law scholars and divorce lawyers.
In Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, the ALl argues
explicitly what Harry Krause argued implicitly: the fundamental
underlying social institution which gives rise to legal benefits is
no longer marriage, but domestic partnership.27 People live in a
variety of ways. The way they live is what gives rise to legal and
24. Harry D. Krause, Marriage for the New Millennium: Heterosexual, Same
Sex-Or Not At All?, 34 FAM. L.Q. 271, 272, 276"(2000).
25. Id. at 278.
26. See generally PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2002).
27. Id. at §§ 6.01-6.06.
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moral obligations. The fact that a marriage has or has not taken
place should have minimal, if any, legal or social implications. In
ALI's view, a marriage vow gives rise to no unique expectations
or obligations fundamental to the principle of social justice in
family life. In ALI's theoretical understanding, marriage is a for-
mal ceremony---the underlying social reality is cohabitation or
domestic partnership, some of which are registered and some of
which are not:
Domestic partners fail to marry for diverse reasons. Among
others, some have been unhappy in prior marriages and
therefore wish to avoid the form of marriage even as they
enjoy its substance with a domestic partner. Some begin a
casual relationship that develops slowly into a durable
union, by which time a formal marriage ceremony may
seem awkward or even unnecessary .... Failure to marry
may also reflect strong social or economic inequality
between the partners, which allows the stronger partner to
resist the weaker partner's preference for marriage.
Finally there are domestic partners who are not allowed to
marry each other under state law because they are of the
same sex .... In all these cases, the absence of formal marriage
may have little or no bearing on the character of the parties' domes-
tic relationship and on the equitable considerations that
underlie claims between lawful spouses at the dissolution
of a marriage.28
ALI's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution simultaneously
endorses the theory that the relationship between law and mar-
riage is simple: marriage in its public, legal form is the creation
of the state, a set of benefits conveyed. Marriage is merely the sum
of its legal incidents. Other views of marriage are described as
religious, psychological, or symbolic. (Note that domestic part-
nership, by contrast, is consistently described in this document as
an objective social fact to which the law must conform and adapt
if it is to do justice.)
From the point of view of family law, the distinction
between a full-blown domestic partnership, like Vermont's
domestic union, and a lawful marriage is merely symbolic.
In law, marriage is simply the sum of its legal incidents.
However from the perspective of religion and social psy-
chology, there are other dimensions to marriage. The
maintenance of marriage as an exclusively heterosexual
opportunity appears to have important symbolic meaning
28. Id. at § 6.02 cmt. a (emphasis added).
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for many persons who are nevertheless hospitable to the
notion of domestic partnership for same-sex couples.29
In this way marriage is reduced from a social institution reg-
ulated by law in order to fulfill important public purposes, to an
emotionally laden symbolic ceremony which confers certain legal
benefits. Marriage is reduced to a rite, which carries rights.
There are many problems with this vision of marriage and its
relationship to law. It reduces marriage to a creature of the state.
By emphasizing the rights of adults, it intrinsically devalues the
interest of children and the community in marriage. By reduc-
ing marriage to an individual right, it undermines the very norms
of commitment it rhetorically upholds. It logically calls into
question the notion of family law itself. If the purpose of mar-
riage and family law is to affirm neutrally the multiplicity of adult
emotional choices, because individual declarations of intimacy
are sacred matters in which the state has no right to interfere,
then the question becomes: why do we have laws about marriage
at all?
At its core, the family diversity rationale for marriage and
family law is conceptually incoherent. It implies that in a mul-
ticultural, pluralistic, interfaith society, marriage can and should
be privatized. Individuals are free to marry, as they are free to
declare eternal vows of love, exchange rings, leap over a broom,
or to engage in any other expressive conduct. But if marriage is
primarily emotional, personal, private, and expressive, the state
has no reason, nor right, to interfere by preferring any form of
marriage to no marriage.3 0
In addition, this new legal theory of marriage suffers under a
more fundamental conceptual inadequacy: it simply is not true.
III. MARRIAGE AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION: THE COUNTER VIEW
Here is an alternative vision of the nature of marriage and
its relationship to law. Marriage is neither merely a rite, nor a
right. What is "older than the Bill of Rights," to use the language
of Griswold l is not a right to marry, but marriage itself as a social
29. Id. at § 6.03 reporter's note cmt. g.
30. For an opposing view, see Milton C. Regan, Jr., Calibrated Commitment:
The Legal Treatment of Marriage and Cohabitation, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1435
(2001).
31. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) ("We deal with a right
of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-older than our political parties, older
than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse,
hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.").
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institution. Marriage arises in every known society32 out of the
need to manage the biological reality that sex between men and
women produces children, the twin social realities that societies
need babies in order to survive, and babies need mothers and
fathers.
Cross-culturally marriage systems vary considerably from our
own marriage tradition. But in virtually every known society,
marriage is about getting men and women into recognized pub-
lic sexual unions where the rights and responsibilities towards
each other and their children are publicly, not merely privately
defined. Marriage is everywhere the potential weak link in the
family system, the place where biological strangers must be
joined in some way that produces a new generation of family ties
strong enough to perform the basic functions families play in any
given society. That is one reason that marriage is never viewed as
merely a private matter, but is everywhere publicly surrounded
with legal, cultural, religious, moral, and familial supports all of
which impinge on an individual's rights and choices, once the
marriage is made.
By contrast the idea that there are many important and wor-
thy intimate relationships outside of marriage is not a new discov-
ery in human affairs. Human beings have never confined all
important intimate relationships to the marriage bond: friend-
ships, free loves, non-conjugal family relationships, political
bonds, work-mates, etc.-many emotionally laden, symbolically
important relationships such as these have been treasured by
individuals. Yet, until quite recently, legislators understood quite
clearly why, of all this panoply of important personal relation-
ships, one particular kind of relation-the marriage bond-was
singled out for public support. Because it is upon this bond,
both relatively fragile and yet indispensable, on which families,
clans, tribes, or societies depend on for their continued
existence.
32. WILLIAM J. DOHERTY ET AL., WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS: TWENTY-ONE
CONCLUSIONS FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 8-9 (Inst. for American Values 2002).
Marriage exists in virtually every known human society.... [A)t least
since the beginning of recorded history, in all the flourishing varieties
of human cultures documented by anthropologists, marriage has been
a universal human institution. As a virtually universal human idea,
marriage is about regulating the reproduction of children, families,
and society .... [M]arriage across societies is a publicly acknowledged
and supported sexual union which creates kinship obligations and
sharing of resources between men, women, and the children that their
sexual union may produce.
R0TES, RIGHTS, AND SOCIAL INSTI'UTIONS
Only societies that reproduce survive. Children do better
when raised by their own two married parents.3" Marriage is key
to integrating men into family life and to reproducing not only
children, but the family system itself. When parents do not get
and stay married their children are less likely to confine
childbearing to marriage and to avoid divorce, creating a down-
ward intergenerational cycle of family fragmentation. Whole
communities suffer when marriage is no longer the normal,
usual, and generally reliable way to raise children.34
Marriage serves many important private, emotional, and/or
religious functions. But giving babies the mothers and fathers
they need, so that society has the next generation it needs, is the
fundamental public purpose of marriage.
IV. How CAN AND DOES THE LAW SUPPORT MARRIAGE
AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION?
A. A Discarded Model: Punitive and Criminal Sanctions
At one time, the public purposes of marriage law, for better
and/or for worse, were etched with crystal clarity into the law.
American law vigorously and with great articulateness promoted
the relationship between sex, fertility, and marriage, by attempt-
ing to regulate virtually all sexual conduct in order (a) to mini-
mize the possibility that children will be produced outside of
33. For a summary of the social science evidence, see DOHERTY ET AL.,
supra note 32. See also LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR
MARRIAGE: WHY MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER AND BETTER-OFF
FINANCIALLY (2000).
34. See COALITION FOR MARRIAGE, FAMILY, AND COUPLES EDUCATION ET AL.,
THE MARRIAGE MOVEMENT: A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES 3-4 (2000) (citations
and emphasis omitted), available at http://www.marriagemovement.org/html/
report.html (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public
Policy).
Nostalgia for the high hopes of the 1970s should not blind us to the
hard truths discovered over the past thirty years: When marriages fail,
children suffer. For many, the suffering continues for years. For
some, it never ends. Children suffer when marriages between parents
do not take place, when parents divorce, and when spouses fail to cre-
ate a "good-enough" family bond.
We come together because we value freedom and cherish our
free society. We recognize that the decline of marriage weakens civil
society and spreads social inequality. Americans of all social classes
and ethnic groups value marriage. Yet, as society retreats from sup-
porting marriage publicly, those who succeed in achieving this aspira-
tion are increasingly likely to be the already highly advantaged: better
educated, more affluent, and white.
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marriage, and (at one time) (b) to maximize the likelihood that
marriages will produce children. Criminal penalties imposed on
fornication, adultery, prostitution, sodomy, and bestiality made it
clear that the marriage license was the only sexual license
granted by the state. At the same time, as contraceptive technol-
ogy advanced, the state responded by banning this perceived
threat to the social purposes of marriage. One need not approve
of using the criminal code to regulate sexuality to note that the
judicial role in striking down these laws had one perhaps largely
inadvertent side-effect: it made the law increasingly inarticulate
about the purpose of marriage law itself.
As criminal penalties for regulating sexual conduct fell into
desuetude (and were eventually struck down by the Supreme
Court as infringements on a new constitutional right to inti-
macy)," the burden of articulating in law the public purposes of
marriage law fell increasingly, if implicitly, in divorce law. By
defining what justified an annulment or a divorce, the state con-
tinued to define shared public norms about what marriage con-
sists of, and what it is for. Failure to consummate a marriage
sexually meant that the marriage, from the state's point of view,
never took place.36 While infertility did not invalidate a marriage
or justify a divorce, a spouse's individual willful refusal to have
any children at all rendered the marriage vow a species of fraud,
from the state's point of view, from which the other spouse could
be released.37 Adultery was punished in divorce law because it
violated the core purpose of marriage, both of creating intact
families, and discouraging illegitimacy. But with the advent of
unilateral divorce in the 1970s, most states have adopted a
divorce process that is, in theory, procedural and non-judgmen-
tal. Whatever advantages of these changes in divorce law, they
35. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
36. See Borten, supra note 22, at 1111; Gerard V. Bradley, Same-Sex Mar-
riage: Our Final Answer? 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 729, 749
(2000) ("Physical defects and incapacities which render a party unable to con-
summate the marriage, existing at the time of the marriage, and which are
incurable are, under most statutes, grounds for annulment."). See also ALASKA
STAT. § 25.24.030 (Michie 2002); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 1506(a)(2) (1999);
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/301(2) (West 1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.02(b)
(West 1990); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3105.31 (F) (Anderson 2003); Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 767.03(2) (West 2003) (including inability or failure to consummate
among grounds for annulment, though several also require nondisclosure of
inability to consummate).
37. Strasser, supra note 14, at 209, n.225 (noting that infertility alone is
not grounds for annulment, but that deception as to willingness or ability to
procreate has been held grounds for annulment); Borten, supra note 22, at
1111.
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too inadvertently served to further muddle or obscure what the
law considers the core public purposes of marriage.
What is clear is that we have moved away from a punitive
model of regulating sexual conduct, including marriage. Does
this necessarily mean the public purposes of marriage have disap-
peared? Are punishment and incentives the only ways in which
the law regulates marriage?
Some legal scholars think so. Laurence Drew Borten, for
example, argues:
The point here is that the conception of marriage as sex-
ual, wherever found in the law, has outlived its usefulness.
Unless and until we contemplate establishing meaningful
legal penalties for fornication, the mere existence of mar-
riage as a legal institution cannot realistically be looked
upon as a means to control sex outside of marriage, and
therefore control out-of-wedlock childbirth.38
Is he right? Or can we explain how the law of marriage
might continue to help sustain the social institution of marriage
in a culture that has rejected criminal and punitive sanctions as a
regulatory instrument for sexuality?
B. Alternative Models for the Relation Between Law and Marriage
Laws do more than punish, as Mary Ann Glendon has
pointed out.39 While she emphasized the role of law as educator,
I would point to other non-punitive functions of law in defining
the boundaries of certain kinds of social organizations, and in
defining certain kinds of relations between people and between
people and things.
One of the most basic ways that the law of marriage helps
regulate out-of-wedlock births (to answer Borten), for example,
is by defining a socially-shared category of married births, with-
out which the very idea of unmarried childbearing disappears.
38. Borten, supra note 22, at 1123.
39. MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW: AMERI-
CAN FAILUREs; EUROPEAN CHALLENGES (1987). Glendon notes, for example:
In England and the United States the view that law is no more or less
than a command backed up by organized coercion has been widely
accepted. The idea that law might be educational, either in purpose
or technique, is not popular among us.
... [L]aw is not just an ingenious collection of devices to avoid or
adjust disputes and to advance this or that interest, but also a way that
society makes sense of things. It is "part of the distinctive manner of
imagining the real."
Id. at 7-8.
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If we cannot tell who is married, we cannot tell who is an
unwed parent. We therefore cannot, in any shared public fash-
ion, teach our children that it is best to wait until marriage
before having a child. One can see the importance of the law in
defining the boundaries of marriage in the experience of Europe
and Canada, which have legally collapsed the concept of cohabi-
tation and marriage. By teaching that cohabitation is just the
same as marriage, the law undermines marriage as a social insti-
tution. But at an even more basic level, collapsing marriage and
cohabitation as legal categories makes it difficult to tell who is
married. Researchers, for example, can no longer see the differ-
ence that marriage makes on adult or child well-being because
the category of marriage has been collapsed into the category of
"co-residential unions."
Thus, one of the core ways the law of marriage protects mar-
riage as a shared social institution is by defining its boundaries:
clearly marked entry and clearly marked exits mean that the cate-
gory of marriage is sharply defined and contrasted with non-
marriage.
This basic step allows the law to serve two additional func-
tions in sustaining marriage: the signaling function and the chan-
neling function.
1. The Signaling Function
How does a young person know what his or her partner
intends? One function of clearly defining marriage by law is to
allow young men and women who do intend a permanent, com-
mitted parenting, financial, and sexual partnership to signal to
one another their clear intentions in this regard. Of course, in
an age of divorce, a mere willingness to marry is no guarantee of
a lifetime relationship. But the absence of the intent to marry
does still carry a clear signal, which, contrary to what ALI
presumes, is that at least one partner does not intend a perma-
nent, faithful partnership. The blurring of the lines between
cohabitation and marriage already disadvantages young women
in particular, who research shows are far more likely to believe
they are in a permanent relationship than the men they live with.
(This may be one reason for the growing trend toward childbear-
ing in cohabiting relationships. )40
40. See WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 33, at 87; Scott M. Stanley et al.,
Maybe I Do: Interpersonal Commitment and Premarital or Nonmarital Cohabitation, J.
FAM. ISSUES (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript on file with the author).
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2. The Channeling Function
Law has a communicative as well as a punitive function.
Marriage is inherently a normative institution. It consists of pre-
ferring a certain type of relationship to others: one that is public,
exclusive, and (in intention) permanent. This preference need
not be ruthless: it is consistent with a wide variety of social and
legal attitudes towards alternative unions, from stigma up
through tolerance and compassion. But it is not consistent with
the idea that it is unfair for the law to distinguish between
nonmarital and marital relationships.
One purpose of defining marriage is to communicate to the
young the essential, broad characteristics of the normative (or
ideal) union: a permanent, faithful, parenting partnership, in
which satisfying the intimacy and sexual needs of the adults is a
goal, but not the entire substance of the relationship. Laws disfa-
voring adultery (such as alienation of affections torts, fault-based
divorce requirements) are examples of ways in which the law
helps reinforce social norms about the content of the marriage
relationship, allowing marriage as a social ideal to shape and
channel romantic expectations and energy of the young towards
particular ends. We need not support these particular mecha-
nisms to acknowledge the importance of having marriage law
that actively reflects and communicates shared norms about mar-
riage, that allows marriage to function as a social institution,
changing the behavior of men and women in ways that benefit
not only them, but their children and the larger community.4"
3. An Analogy: Private Property
The law plays a similar role in defining the boundaries of
other important institutions, such as the corporation. It defines
the general purpose of a for-profit corporation (pooling
resources for an economically productive enterprise); it creates
special instruments that serve that purpose (limiting losses of
shareholders to the value of the shares purchased, for example).
We know what a corporation is, and who owns and controls it,
because the law regulates and defines the boundaries of the insti-
tution and its core public or shared purpose.
Similarly, like marriage, private property is not the creature
of the state. The idea and the reality of private property are far
older than our nation or any nation now existing. But in com-
41. For a discussion of how marriage norms help change the attitudes,
expectations and behavior of men and women towards each other, towards
their children, and towards the future, see WuATE & GALLAGHER, supra note 33.
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plex societies, the law plays a key role in sustaining private prop-
erty as a social institution. If private property is to function as a
social institution, we need to know who owns the property, what
a person who owns property may do with it, and we need to raise
our children to respect property rights. Likewise, if marriage is
to function as a social institution, and not merely as a private act,
we need to know who is married, what we expect of married peo-
ple, and what the basic shared meaning of the marriage act is,
and we need to raise our children to respect the institution of
marriage.
V. MARRIAGE-SuPPORTIVE LEGAL REFORM:
FOUR PRINCIPLES, FIVE PROPOSALS
So far I have argued that (1) the fundamental public pur-
pose of law is to encourage men and women to enter and sustain
the permanent public sexual union ("marriage") that both cre-
ates and protects the children their sexual unions may produce,
and that (2) laws do so in the current context primarily by defin-
ing who is married and what our basic, shared norms of marriage
are, rather than by creating a set of legal incentives or
punishments.
What are the implications of this view for law and public pol-
icy? To return to our original question, how can we distinguish
laws and public policy that strengthen marriage from those that
weaken or degrade it? I propose the following four principles,
followed by five specific proposals for marriage law reforms.
A. Four Principle.
Law and public policies strengthen marriage only when
they:
1. Protect the Boundaries of Marriage.
In order for marriage to function as a social institution, the
community must know who is married. Pro-marriage laws and
policies distinguish married couples from other family and
friendship units, so that people and communities can tell who is
married, and who is not. The harder it is to distinguish married
couples from other kinds of relationships, the harder it is for
communities to reinforce norms of marital behavior, the harder
it is for couples to identify the meaning of their own relationship,
and the more difficult it is for marriage to fulfill its function as a
social institution.
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2. Treat the Married Couple as a Social, Legal, and Financial
Unit.
Legal and public policy reforms that either treat married
couples as if they were unmarried individuals or treat unmarried
couples as if they were married are likely to weaken marriage as a
social institution.
3. Transmit and Reinforce Shared Norms of Responsible
Marital Behavior.
Marriage changes behavior because it is more than a private
relationship created by the couple for the couples' private pur-
poses. Marriage changes behavior in healthy ways because mar-
riage has shared social meanings. Marriage is inherently
normative. Law and public policy help strengthen marriage
when they reinforce (or at a minimum clearly communicate)
social concerns surrounding basic norms of responsible marital
behaviors, such as encouraging permanence, fidelity, financial
responsibility, and mutual support and discouraging violence or
destructive conflict, for example.
4. Communicate a Socially Shared Preference for Marriage as
the Ideal Family Form, Particularly to Young People
of Reproductive Age.
In reviewing marriage-strengthening public policies, I do
not consider policies whose conceptual goal is to create marriage
neutrality, or a level-playing field between married and unmar-
ried individuals, unless there is substantial independent evidence
that such a reform would reduce family fragmentation. Such pol-
icies, while they may further other legitimate public interests, are
not likely to strengthen marriage as a social institution. A prefer-
ence for marriage is not a public policy trump card. Any number
of theoretical marital preferences may be imprudent or conflict
with vital competing social values (such as protecting children in
single-parent families). On the other hand, any law or public
policy that explicitly operates on the principle that preferences
for marriage are in themselves a form of discrimination against
unmarried individuals cannot be viewed as a pro-marriage initia-
tive. If marriage is a social good, and a key social institution, neu-
trality is not an appropriate goal for public policy.
B. Five Brief Proposals
Here are just a few brief examples of the legal reforms that
meet these standards, offered in order to widen the public dis-
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cussion of how law might better articulate and support the public
purposes of marriage law.
1. Codify the Basic Obligations of Marriage by Statute.
Marriage is created by the freely-given consent of a man and
woman, witnessed by church and/or state, to enter into a perma-
nent sexual, financial, emotional, and parenting union. Its basic
obligations include sexual fidelity, permanence, and mutual care
and support of each other and any children of their union.
Require couples to sign an affidavit upon getting a marriage
license affirming that they have read and understood these basic
obligations.
2. Establish a Preference for Married Couples in Adoption
Law.
3. Refuse to Create Legally Fatherless Children.
If single people use donor insemination, biological fathers
retain legal responsibility (unless another man is willing to
assume legal fatherhood in a process analogous to adoption).
4. Revive Common-Law Marriage, by Statute, to Deal with
Hard Cases.
A couple who has lived together for seven years and held
themselves out as a married couple, will be viewed as having suc-
cessfully created a marriage, even without the witness of church
or state. Estop any partners who have claimed to be married
before a government official or agency from later claiming they
were not married, for the purposes of property distribution and
alimony when the relationship ends.
5. Require a Spouse to Wait Two Years, and Show Due
Diligence (Presumably Through Counseling) Before
Obtaining a Non-Consensual, No-Fault
Divorce.
Require a waiting period of one year (with a due diligence
requirement) for no-fault divorce by mutual consent when there
are children.
VI. THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE LAw
Before we can decide what the proper legal structure for
marriage is, we need a working theory of the relationship
between marriage and law-an understanding of what marriage
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law is and why we have laws only about this one kind of personal
relationship as opposed to all other intimate relationships worthy
of respect.
The proposition on the table is this: marriage exists in every
known society, including ours, as a public act and not just a pri-
vate vow, because sex between men and women produces babies
on a regular basis. From a public, legal standpoint, marriage is
the attempt to regulate, by a variety of means not limited to pun-
ishment or incentives, the relationships between men and
women in order to maximize the likelihood that (a) children will
have mothers and fathers and (b) society will get the well-nur-
tured next generation we all need.
Even in a culture that makes full use of contraceptive and
abortion technology, half of all pregnancies are unintended and
one-third of our children are born outside of marriage. The
costs to children and society amply demonstrate that this view of
marriage is not an outmoded institution.
The law is not the only, or the most important actor, in cre-
ating and sustaining the social institution of marriage. But by
protecting the boundaries of marriage, by defining who is mar-
ried and who is not, and by communicating basic norms of what
marriage means, marriage law serves to enable other important
private actors to do what is necessary to sustain the marriage idea
in order to create and protect the next generation.
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